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T H E U N I V E R S I T Y O F A L B E R T A

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THE UNIVERSITY OF ALBERTA

TOWARD A 'TRANSCENDENCE' OF HUMAN REASON:
AN ANALYSIS OF THE SIGNIFICANCE
OF KANT'S THEORY OF TASTE

by



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The undersigned certify that they have read, and recommend to the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research, for acceptance, a thesis entitled TOWARD A 'TRANSCENDENCE' OF HUMAN REASON: AN ANALYSIS OF THE SIGNIFICANCE OF KANT'S THEORY OF TASTE submitted by PAUL KASHIYAMA in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts.

ABSTRACT

In the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant has presented the Judgment as a mediating faculty between Understanding and Reason. The understanding, (together with Sensibility), provides objects, whereas the reason provides "Ideas" or principles. It is the task of the Judgment to make the application of the principles to objects possible. But, the theoretical function of judgment is 'determinant', i.e. the subsumption of the particular under the universal is dependent upon the laws of formal logic, and hence, is analytic. What Kant calls the 'reflective' judgment, however, is one which relies upon the presupposition of a certain end. It is, thus, the "reflective judgement" which is in need of a "Critique". That is to say, the Critique of Judgement seeks to solve the problem of determining whether and how it is possible a priori to judge Nature as being adapted to an end. Moreover, since, such a question is neither one of knowledge nor one of will, it is neither theoretical nor practical. The object of Kant's concern, therefore, is the reflection or the contemplation of Nature through the presupposition of its purposiveness or finality. Here, we are given two ways to proceed: 1) aesthetically, by regarding nature as adapting to the reflecting subject as such, and 2) teleologically, by viewing Nature as having her own finality. Accordingly, Kant divides his attention to each of these kinds of judgments in the two parts of the Critique of Judgement.

What I shall concentrate my attention, however, is only to the philosophical significance of Kant's conception of the "aesthetic judgment". And, through the course of this thesis, I shall argue for the consistency and the intelligibility of Kant's theory of taste which, I believe, sheds much light upon the confused parameters of contemporary aesthetics.

Also, this thesis is a defense of Kant's theory against Hume's empirical approach. The judgment of the beautiful is not to be confused with that of the agreeable nor the good, since the beautiful lacks any empirical reality as it consists in a delight felt by the agent as he reflects upon the representation of an object.

Thus, a taste judgment is concerned only with the "form" of the object presented in the mind. And, it is in this that the clue to the intelligibility of the purposiveness of aesthetic objects is to be discovered. The purposiveness of the beautiful is a result of its adaptation to the principles which enable its representation. The understanding, whose function is to present objects, are both requisites for the formulation of a taste judgment. As such, both the imagination and the understanding must co-operate with one another in 'harmony' so as to produce the feeling--state of pleasure in the beautiful.

Furthermore, since the relation to the principles of objective ideation obtains, the ground of "pure" aesthetic judgment points to the "supersensible substrate of humanity" which is the ground of cognition in general. The purposiveness of the aesthetic object is universally communicable, even though any proof by means of concepts is precluded from a claim of taste. And the approach toward the supersensible sub-

strate is also what allows a philosopher to be freed from the mere phenomenality of cognition so that he may grasp a more comprehensive view of the whole of human experience. But what would result from such a 'transcendence' is a subject for future studies.

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CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

The Problem

With his Critique of Pure Reason (the first of three Critical works), Kant has contributed significantly to the liberation of philosophy from the fetters of the dogmatic doctrines of the traditional rationalism and empiricism. In his attempt to give an account of knowledge, Kant uses "experience" as a starting block but does not rely upon experience, to provide the basis of human cognition. All knowledge begins in experience, Kant admits, but he denies the claim that it is necessarily derived from experience. Here, mathematics is a convincing case in point: It commands the status of being "knowledge" but since it precludes any empirical justification, Kant deems it "synthetic" and "a priori". Thus, it is one of Kant's greatest contribution to philosophy that the significance of the subject is brought to bear along with the empirical aspects of our experience in order that an intelligible account of human experience may be given. However, if a philosopher chooses to present a conception of knowledge which precludes an empirical justification, he must assume responsibility for providing a viable alternative. Kant, being a transcendental philosopher, provides such an alternative through a Deduction of conditions which make experience in general possible.

In his efforts to obtain this end, Kant's Critical works have

served to illuminate what I take to be an indispensable distinction between the activities of the imaginative and the conceptual aspects of human reasoning. Kant's Critical works are three. And regardless of whether the number of volumes is an instantiation of the often ridiculed "archetectonic", it is certain that Kant had not explicated the full range of activities of which the imagination is capable within the parameters of the first Critique. Given the limitations that are encumbent upon me, it is far from my intention to offer a systematic exegesis of the development of Kant's Critical endeavour throughout his 'trilogy'. Rather, in this thesis, I shall inquire into the essential relationship between the two cognitive faculties, i.e. the imagination and the understanding, and their further association with the faculty of Judgment which ultimately supplies the intelligibility of the former pair. To this end, I shall focus upon the functional and theoretical aspects of cognitive judgment and its counterpart, aesthetic judgment.

It should be pointed out at the outset, however, that Kant's conception of the "aesthetic" is broad enough that, within it, everything pertaining to the perception of pleasure and displeasure is included. That is to say, Kant includes under the rubric of "aesthetic judgment" those judgments concerned with the "agreeable", the "beautiful", as well as the "good". Thus it will be necessary to isolate that kind of judgment which can genuinely be considered as the aesthetic counterpart of cognitive or conceptual judgment. And, according to Kant, such a judgment is exemplified in the judgment of the "beautiful", that is to say, in the "pure aesthetic judgment" which is the result of the exercise of our faculty of "taste". In so far as this is necessary, much of what I

have to say will deal, more specifically, with Kant's theory of taste (which differs radically from that of his empiricist rival David Hume). In addition, in order to give an air of completeness to this thesis, I shall also consider a few of the possible objections whose solution, I believe, will aid us in fulfilling my primary aim in attempting this endeavour, i.e. to understand what Kant intended to say.

Theoretical Underpinnings of Aesthetic Judgment

Generally speaking, Kant conceives the Judgment in his theoretical Critique as the "faculty of subsuming under rules; that is, of distinguishing whether something does or does not stand under a given rule (causa datae legis)" (A132).¹ Furthermore, this faculty is, for Kant, "a peculiar talent which can be practised only, and cannot be taught. It is the specific quality of so-called mother-wit; and its lack no school can make good" (A133/B172).² A man wanting in the "talent", says Kant, "may comprehend the universal in abstracto, and yet not be able to distinguish whether a case in concreto comes under it" (A134/B172).³ Such a man, then, could neither apply the rules he knows to the particular information he receives, nor could he proceed from such particulars to the rules which subsume it.

In relative consonance with his theoretical Critique, Kant, in the section entitled the "transcendental Judgement In General" in the third Critique, reiterates that subsumption is indeed an important characteristic of judgment. However, Kant has made a new discovery since he wrote the first Critique, namely, that aside from the task of subsump-

tion, the judgment has an additional task of finding a rule for the given particular, i.e. the 'reflective' activity of judgment.

This so-called "reflective judgment" is to be distinguished from the judgment as presented in the first Critique, to which Kant gives the name of "determinant judgment". The judgment functioning in its 'determinant' capacity is non-autonomous to the extent that it is determined by 'rules' which are external to itself. In contrast, the judgment in its 'reflective' capacity supplies its own rules or principles so that the content of the manifold and the particular law can be formed into a systematic unity.

What the reflective judgment supplies to itself, therefore, is a subjective principle. The reference to a systematic whole, without which no experience is possible, cannot be made independently of the 'regulative principles' which guide the mind in organizing the manifold. And, since the systematic unity cannot be given in intuition, such principles are products of reason which Kant calls "ideas of reasons": They are the results of the judgment acting in its reflective capacity as it presupposes that nature is determined by universal laws and that its empirical laws are intelligible to human reason.

Consequently, the faculty of judgment as characterized in the Critique of Judgment becomes a richer notion than the judgment à la Critique of Pure Reason, which was merely a faculty performing the subsumption of particulars under the universal rules of nature. The expanded notion of judgment, in turn, allows the comparison of particular laws whose specific differences were left unaccounted for by the earlier

conception of judgment. From Kant's later perspective:

in groping about among natural forms, whose mutual agreement with common empirical but higher law would [otherwise] be regarded by the judgment as entirely fortuitous, it would be yet more coincidental if individual perceptions had ever docilely adapted themselves to an empirical law; but it would be far more fortuitous that manifold empirical laws happened to be fitted for the systematic unity of natural knowledge in a totally interconnected possible experience, without, by means of an a priori principle, presupposing nature to have such a form (FI 210).⁴

And, further in the same passage, Kant adds that: "Under no circumstances can a principle like this be posted to the account of experience, because only under this assumption is it possible to order experience in a systematic fashion" (FI 211).⁵

At this point, we should note that, although at one level of comprehension, the distinction between determinant and reflective judgment can be meaningful, its validity has been questioned in the recent past. For the purposes of this discussion, however, I shall assume this distinction to be meaningful if only to highlight another distinction, namely, that between two levels or aspects discernible from Kant's account of judgment. These two aspects are evident from the consideration of the differences between judging in the sense of Urteilen and estimation or evaluation in the sense of Beurteilen. Prof. F.P. Van De Pitte, in an essay entitled "Is Kant's Distinction Between Reflective And Determinant Judgment Valid?", effectively points out that: "...reflective judgment plays an essential role in the sub-system to which determinant judgment belongs--and from which the reflective-determinant distinction would exclude it."⁶ In spite of this, I believe that it is useful to distinguish between one aspect ('species') and another ('sub-species')

even if, in the end, they are part and parcel of the same thing. Accordingly, whether the distinction is invalid ought not to have any pernicious results on our consideration of judgment as acting in two distinguishable capacities as long as we do not give the impression that they are logically distinct and separable judgments.

In addition to the modification of the notion of judgment which has taken place since the first Critique, there seems to be yet another with respect to the activities of the two cognitive faculties, i.e. the imagination and the understanding. That is to say, in interpreting the result of Kant's Deduction in the Critique of Pure Reason, one may conclude that, for Kant, the imagination possesses the capacity to reorganize the subjective (spatio-temporal) order of impressions (or perceptions), i.e. to synthesize the manifold into an image to which the understanding can apply a specific (empirical) concept. Since sensations are organized into an image whose principle of unity is identical to that of concepts in general, cognitive experiences can be deemed objective.

Although it may not be 'incorrect' to draw such a conclusion, there is one crucial point which must be kept in mind. And the point is this. We find that the imagination is really an 'aspect' of the faculty of the understanding. The imagination is, so to speak, 'harnessed' both externally and internally. Insofar as the production of an image requires the presence of the categories (of the understanding), the imagination is harnessed internally; and insofar as the application of the concept is necessary for cognition, the activity of the imagination is harnessed externally. Accordingly, we may conclude that the imagination

is consistent with the understanding in its functions.

Moreover, the harnessing of the imagination at these two levels does not seem to be performed by an identical facet of the understanding. In other words, the aspect of the understanding which applies the concept to the image does not seem sufficient for giving an adequate account of the formation of the image, and vice versa. It appears then that although it is, in one sense of the term, the 'same' understanding which harnesses the activities of the imagination, in another sense, it does seem to make sense to distinguish between what may be called the 'conceptual understanding' and the 'imaginative understanding' so that the differences in their function can be clarified.

It is also evident that, at the time of writing his theoretical Critique, Kant was well aware of this distinction implicit within the notion of the understanding as the following passage shows:

It is the one and the same spontaneity, which in the one case, under the title of imagination, and in the other, under the title of understanding, brings combination into the manifold of intuition. (B161 n.)

Thus, any interpretation of the Kantian Critique of cognition ought not to assume that there are two independent syntheses performed by the understanding on the one hand, and the imagination on the other.

However, when one turns his attention to the elucidation of aesthetic judgment in the third Critique, he is faced with a difficulty; that is to say Kant does ascribe to the imagination a stronger power which, at least prima facie, makes it appear as though the imagination can function independently of the understanding. But, as it will be made clear, this is merely a superficial feature of Kant's elucidation;

and Kant does remain consistent with his first Critique by restricting the power of synthesis to the activity of the understanding, while modifying or expanding the scope of the function of the imagination as it partakes in the formulation of an aesthetic judgment. The imagination is, in the third Critique, "free". Let us see what this can mean.

FOOTNOTES FOR CHAPTER ONE

1. I. Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, tr. N.K. Smith, St. Martins Press, New York, 1965. I shall herefrom refer to this volume by the initials 'CPR'.
2. Ibid., A133/B172.
3. Ibid., A134/B172.
4. I. Kant, First Introduction to the Critique of Judgment, tr. J. Haden, Bobbs-Merrill Co. Inc., New York, 1965, 210. I shall hereafter refer to this volume by the initials 'FI'; and the number which follows indicates the page number of the Academie edition which Haden supplies in his margins.
5. Ibid., 211
6. F.P. Van De Pitte, "Is Kant's Distinction Between Reflective and Determinant Judgment Valid?", cf. Akten des 4. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses Mainz 6.-10 April 1974 Teil 11.1, Sonderdruck, Walter de Gruyter, Berlin, p.450.
7. Kant, CPR, B161.

CHAPTER TWO

KANT'S AESTHETIC JUDGMENT

Cognition Vs. Aesthetic Judgment

In his Critique of Judgment, Kant explicates the special nature of aesthetic judgments. According to Kant, an aesthetic judgment "is not a cognitive judgement, and so not logical, but is aesthetic--which means that it is one whose determining ground cannot be other than subjective"¹ (CJ 203). In claiming this, Kant is still consistent with his first Critique. He maintains that "every reference of representations is capable of being objective, even that of sensation (in which case it signifies the real in an empirical representation)" (CJ 203).² However, Kant does insist on "one exception", namely, "the feeling of pleasure and displeasure": "This denotes nothing in the object, but is a feeling which the Subject has of itself and of the manner in which it is affected by the representation"³ (CJ 204). For Kant, "aesthetic judgements" (which include judgments of taste) are defined in terms of the subjective awareness of the sensation of delight which accompanies a given representation. And the question which Kant poses to himself is "whether and how, aesthetic judgements are possible"⁴ (CJ 218).

Briefly stated, Kant's aesthetic judgments begin as perceptual judgments but they involve 'estimations' or evaluations of the object; and they are about the feeling-states of pleasure and displeasure rather

than about the representation of the object itself. They do, however, involve the essential unity of the cognitive faculties of imagination and understanding. They differ from logical judgments in that they are always "singular" or individual and never universal. Since they merely predicate the feeling-state of pleasure, no concept is necessary for their formulation.

In addition, according to Kant, the "beautiful" is to be distinguished from the "agreeable" or the "enjoyable", and the "good" or that which is the object of approbation, because in making a claim to beauty (a taste judgment) the agent is required to be without any interest in the actual existence of the object. The object is taken, in a judgment of taste, simply as an occasion for the 'free' emergence of the feeling of pleasure.

To a judgment of taste, the 'subjective universal validity' is also ascribable because its determining ground is universal among rational, sentient human beings and displays a "conformity to law without law". It embodies, therefore, a "subjective principle of subsumption" which makes it reflective and uniquely distinct from logical or cognitive judgments⁵ (CJ 287).

These are some of the highlights of Kant's arguments in the "Analytic of the Beautiful" in the Critique of Judgment. We must now proceed with an examination of some of the relevant details involved with the text itself, so that a clearer grasp of Kant's conception of aesthetic judgments in general and taste judgments in particular may be had.

Early in his third Critique, Kant makes explicit the issue con-

cerning judgments of taste:

All one wants to know is whether the mere representation of the object is to my liking, no matter how indifferent I may be to the real existence of the object of this representation. It is quite plain that in order to say that the object is beautiful, and to show that I have taste, everything turns on the meaning which I can give to this representation, and not on any factor which makes me dependent on the real existence of the object.⁶ (CJ 205)

It is evident that, for Kant, the issue of taste judgments revolves around the existence of the feeling-state (rather than that of the object of representation) which serves as a ground of the formulation of such judgments.

Kant also claims that there are "three different relations of representations to the feeling of pleasure and displeasure, as a feeling in respect of which we distinguish different objects or modes of representation": "The agreeable is what gratifies a man; the beautiful what simply pleases him; the good what is esteemed (approved)"⁷ (CJ 209-210). It will be instructive, therefore, to keep in mind these distinguishable characteristics of predicates such as 'agreeable', 'good' and 'beautiful'. Of course, to the extent that we are specifically interested in judgments of taste, it is essential that the meaning of the predicate "beautiful" be explicated in the sequel.

Kant holds that, the "judgment of taste is not a cognitive judgment..., and hence, also, is not grounded on concepts, nor yet intentionally directed to them"⁸ (CJ 209). It does, however, signify a pre-existing relationship between the beautiful and the feeling-state of pleasure. Consequently, Kant says that: "Taste is the faculty of estimating an object or a mode of representation by means of a delight or aver-



sion apart from any interest; the object of such a delight is called beautiful"⁹ (CJ 211).

One difficulty which is directly related to this passage is this. If "taste is the faculty of estimating an object", then one may interpret this to mean that the judgment of taste is essentially equivalent to what the faculty of taste does, i.e. "estimate" [beurteilen] the object. But, at least to the extent that the judgment of taste is concerned with the pre-existing relationship between the "beautiful" and the feeling of pleasure or displeasure, the judgment of taste cannot precede the pleasure in the beautiful. If this is right, then Kant's claim in Section 9 of the "Analytic of the Beautiful", that the "estimating of the object" precedes the pleasure in the beautiful, becomes problematic. Therefore, if the expression "estimating of the object" is taken to be synonymous with the "judgment of taste", Kant's claim seems to be at odds with the apparent (logical) priority of taste judgments proper. What then does Kant mean by an "estimation" of the object? This question must be resolved, for it is the solution to this particular problem which Kant takes to be "the key to the Critique of taste". In order to answer these and other related questions, we must delve deeper into Kant's arguments in the "Analytic of the Beautiful" paying special attention to the ninth section.

To begin with, in Section 9, Kant argues that:

Were the pleasure in a given object to be the antecedent, and were the universal communicability of this pleasure to be all that the judgement of taste is meant to allow to the representation of the object, such a sequence would be self-contradictory. For a pleasure of that kind would be nothing but the feeling of mere agreeableness to the senses, and so, from its very nature, would possess no more than private validity, seeing that it would be immediately

dependent on the representation through which the object is given.¹⁰ (CJ 216-217)

It is important to note here that Kant is dealing with what is 'in' a judgment of taste, and thus, we should not be misled into thinking that both pleasure in, and the estimation of, the object are somehow separate from the taste judgment itself. Nevertheless, Kant's position on this matter is at first enigmatic. In order to prevent any unnecessary confusion, I shall try to restrict the term 'estimation' to the rendering of the German Beurteilung, and the term 'judgment' to Urteilung. The former shall thus refer to the non-cognitive evaluation or as Meridith translates "estimation" of the object; and the latter to the cognitive judgment which has as its end the 'knowledge' of the object.

The difficulty seems primarily to be one of interpretation. It is, in one respect, useful to draw a clear line of demarcation between a Beurteilung des Gegenstandes (an estimation of the object) and a Geschmacksurteil (a judgment of taste) as Crawford does in his book Kant's Aesthetic Theory.¹¹ (Note, that Crawford does not follow Meridith in rendering the term beurteilen as 'estimating' but employs Bernard's rendering of 'judging'. I shall, however, use the former term whenever applicable for ease of comprehension.)

In his very informative discussion of the third Critique, Crawford suggests that the 'estimation of the object', i.e. the "contemplation of and/or reflection on the form of the object", gives rise to the harmony between the cognitive faculties, that is, to the mutual accord of activities of the imagination and the understanding which forms a basis for the emergence of pleasure. Of course, pleasure cannot result if the

representation of the object does not give rise to a harmonious accordance between the cognitive faculties. Thus, for Kant, such a dis-harmony forms the basis for dis-pleasure in the agent who would then perceive the representation, not as being beautiful, but as being sublime.

Furthermore, according to Crawford's account, the fundament of a judgment that a specific object is beautiful consists in the agent's awareness of the harmony or (what, unfortunately, for Crawford amounts to the same thing) the pleasure in the object: "The feeling of pleasure in the beautiful is a consequent of the activity of judging the object; it is the product of that activity"¹² (Crawford, p.74). Crawford's suggestion is, then, that the judgment of taste is preceded by the pleasure which is in turn preceded by the 'estimation' of the object.

The obvious advantage of Crawford's interpretation of Section 9 is that it allows us to make some sense of the 'apparent contrariety displayed by Kant's mode of expression. However, as hinted above, Crawford's mode of expression is not entirely precise either. As it will be made clear in the sequel, what Kant means by a "taste judgment" is more than a mere 'pronouncement' that an object X is beautiful. Such a pronouncement is only the last stage or component of the whole of a taste judgment. Thus, to imply as he seems to do in the above quoted passage, that the 'estimation of the object' can take place prior to the 'judgment of taste' is somewhat misleading in its phraseology.

A similar problem accompanies Crawford's claim that the taste judgment succeeds the pleasure arising from the harmonious accord between the imagination and the understanding, because for Kant, the production of pleasure and its awareness are also components of the taste judgment

proper.

It would seem, then, that while Crawford does offer a *prima facie* plausible 'solution' for the difficulty involved with "the key to the Critique of taste", the subtleties of expression have escaped his attention. I shall, therefore, proceed with the task of clarifying the interpretive obscurities concerning the issue of taste judgments.

One way to approach our problem is to view what Kant contends in the later section entitled the "General Remarks on the First Section of the Analytic". There, Kant says that:

If, now, imagination must in the judgment of taste be regarded in its freedom, then, to begin with, it is not taken as reproductive, as in its subjection to the laws of association, but as productive and exerting an activity of its own (as originator of arbitrary forms of possible intuitions).¹³ (CJ 241)

Although the implications of this suggestion are far reaching and more than we could handle at this point, we are at least made aware of an important fact: that the experience of the beautiful involving the freedom of the imagination is ascribed to the productive function of the imagination. However, since judgments of taste are non-cognitive, no concepts are applicable to the particular manifold of sensations. Even so, the contention is that the two cognitive faculties, the imagination and the understanding, are at work in a similar (or at least analogous) manner as in the case of cognition. Of course, we must remember that cognitive judgments are "determinate" since the kind of unification which is involved with them is governed by concepts (pure or empirical), i.e. the syntheses of the imagination.

Aesthetic judgments are, in contrast, "reflective". In other

words, there can be no external 'rules', be they concepts or schemata, determining the character of the unification of the manifold in aesthetic judgments. In an aesthetic perception, according to Kant, one does not begin with a concept or a universal and seek to subsume the particular representation under it. Rather, the manifold is 'reflected' upon so as to discover 'freely' a possible unity in the manifold.

Broadly speaking, the point at which the two cognitive faculties are in harmony with one another, i.e. where the subject feels as though a concept could apply, were there such a concept, is the point at which the pleasure in the beautiful is felt. Thus, Kant can be read as saying that, in an aesthetic experience of the beautiful, the two cognitive faculties function by connecting the constituents of the manifold of intuition in such a way that if there were an applicable concept it could be applied to this unity.

If, therefore, the 'estimating' or the 'evaluating' of the object is to precede the emergence of the feeling of pleasure, then Kant could have had in mind this kind of 'reflection' or 'contemplation' which can function as the necessary pre-condition for the production of the pleasure in the beautiful.

In this connection, we should note that the generality of the above account still runs the risk of confounding the essential distinguishing characteristics of aesthetic judgments and judgments of cognition. The analogous relationship between them, however plausible, should be taken with a grain of salt. For one thing, we must remember that, in cognition, the imagination cannot be totally free of the constraints placed upon it by the understanding. Since it is internally harnessed by the presence

of the categories, the combination of the manifold represented by the imagination must, at least in theory, be capable of being subsumed under a concept. But a judgment of taste does not have as its object the representation itself. Rather, a judgment that something is beautiful is, for Kant, more like a statement about the pleasure which an agent feels in contemplating a particular representation. Such a representation, according to Kant, occasions a feeling that his cognitive faculties are in harmony with one another, thereby producing the pleasure which is expressed by the predicate "beautiful". A taste judgment is an expression of felt pleasure or displeasure. It is by virtue of this, that taste judgments are distinguishable from cognitive judgments. That is to say, at least at the empirical level, no concept is required in its formulation, and hence, the experience relating to a taste judgment is, as Kant says, "aesthetic".

In addition, we should also note that by the phrase 'an expression of felt pleasure or displeasure' we are attempting to avoid the kind of difficulties Crawford seemed to have experienced, i.e. giving the impression that the term 'taste judgment' refers only to the pronouncement that an object is beautiful or sublime and not to the other components which Kant has included under the title of "taste judgment". As it turns out, such a pronouncement is merely the final step which follows the agent's awareness of the pleasure (or displeasure) which results from the harmony (or disharmony) of the cognitive faculties arising from the estimation of the object. In this light, Kant's conception of the "taste judgment" is expressive of the whole process of an exercise of taste. And as such, the Judgment in the Critique of Judgment seems to become not so much a

faculty (in the sense of power to act) but practice itself. Thus, in providing us with an analysis of the structure of "Judgment", Kant can also be seen as providing us with an analysis which has some implications for the structure of life itself.

However, returning to the question at hand, we do not yet have evidence that the distinction between aesthetic and cognitive judgment is indeed valid. For in order for a judgment to be regarded as aesthetic in the genuine sense, it must also be free of the determination of the categories, i.e. pure concepts. In cognition, the understanding demands that the manifold is brought together in accordance with the categories so that the representation is intelligible for the application of the concept. Can the case be any different with aesthetic judgments? Moreover, even if we say that, in aesthetic perception, the imagination discovers that the manifold is already intelligible so as to be consistent with the understanding, we must also be able to account for its intelligibility, without any recourse to the guidance of the categories. But, how is this possible?

We are thus in need of an elaboration of Kant's presupposition that there can be an aesthetic experience which is distinct from its cognitive counterparts. This is necessary for showing that the activity of the imagination in aesthetic perception is "free" even from its internal fetters of the faculty of concepts. For, unless Kant is able to make his case stand in this matter, the intelligibility of the notion of "freedom" with respect to the imagination remains suspect.

Judgment of Perception Vs. Aesthetic Judgment

It is perhaps instructive at this point to offer a brief reminder. For Kant, judgments of taste involve aesthetic estimations of the object rather than a cognitive determination. The former result in the production of pleasure or displeasure; the latter result in knowledge of the phenomenal object.

It would appear that what Kant requires is a kind of consciousness of a representation that does not rely on the syntheses of the imagination. For if such an awareness or consciousness were constrained by the activities of the imagination characteristic of cognition, there does not seem to be any way to maintain its uniqueness. In this context, the initial problem at hand appears to be one of accounting for the possibility of a perception which is independent of the imaginative syntheses. Therefore, it may be appropriate that we consider next how Kant conceives the notion of "judgment of perception"; and what kinds of perceptions are allowed within the framework of Kant's theory.

In the Prolegomena To Any Future Metaphysics, Kant asserts that:

All our judgements are at first merely judgement of perception; they hold good only for us (that is, for our subject), and we do not till afterward give them a new reference (to an object) and desire that they shall always hold good for us and in the same way for everybody else; for when a judgement agrees with an object, all judgements concerning the same object must likewise agree among themselves, and thus the objective validity of the judgement of experience signifies nothing else than its necessary universal validity.¹⁴
(Prolegomena p.46)

Presumably then, judgments of taste can also be regarded as being, at first simple "judgements of perception". This is not to suggest, however, that even aesthetic judgments can eventually come to have objective valid-

ity. On the contrary, aesthetic judgments can never come to have the kind of objectivity that is open to judgments of cognition. Aesthetic judgments "express a relation of two sensations to the same subject": "When we say, 'The room is warm, sugar sweet, and wormwood bitter', we have only subjectively valid judgements."¹⁵ (Prolegomena p.47.) Thus, while it may be that all judgments begin as "merely judgements of perception", it is necessary to distinguish between a) judgments which possess the potential to signify objectivity, and hence rely upon the imaginative syntheses according to the categories, and b) judgments which express the relations which hold between the subject and his perceived sensations; and since such judgments do not refer to any objects, no reliance upon the imaginative syntheses is deducible. Kant is quite clear when he speaks about the first kind of judgment in the first Critique:

Now it is imagination that connects the manifold of sensible intuition; and imagination is dependent for the unity of its intellectual synthesis upon the understanding, and for the manifoldness of its apprehension upon the sensibility. All possible perception is thus dependent upon the synthesis of apprehension, and this empirical synthesis in turn upon the transcendental synthesis, and therefore upon the categories. Consequently, all possible perceptions, and therefore everything that can come to empirical consciousness, that is, all appearances of nature, must, so far as their connection is concerned, be subjected to the categories.¹⁶ (B164-165)

And, we should note that, here, Kant is speaking of what we have called the 'imaginative understanding'.

The kind of judgment exemplified by the propositional form "this R is W", (where R signifies a certain object and W a subjective sensation), has only subjective validity: The matter given in sensation is neither synthesized nor ascribed to objects as appearance. The judgment that "this room is warm", for example, cannot be an assertion about a

necessary connection between the room and the sensation of warmth. Such a sensation is, therefore, something which can be had independently of cognition proper; and points to an internal distinction in the meaning of "perception", i.e. between a perception of a sensation and a perception of an appearance of nature. It is only the latter type of perception which is governed by the categories, in the context of the above quoted passage.

I think, now, that we are reasonably assured of the possibility of there being a perception (awareness) which is 'free' of the determination of the categories. Unfortunately, this entails neither that judgments of taste are species of this kind of perceptual judgments, nor that the facts about such judgments of perception are sufficient for solving all of the problems related with aesthetic judgments (including taste judgments).

It is true, however, that there are *prima facie* similarities to the extent that they are both judgments about how certain sensations affect the agent, i.e. how the agent feels 'towards' particular representations. But, this similarity extends only to the empirical aesthetic judgment and not to taste judgments. Kant's conception of a judgment of perception is constituted by a connection of "mere intuition" in a particular awareness, albeit with neither a reference to a concept nor to an object.¹⁷ (Prolegomena p.49.) Consequently, it bears some resemblance to what Kant calls the "aesthetic judgement of sense" in Section 14 of the third Critique. They are both singular, and have only subjective validity since they are judgments not about the phenomenal object but about appearances.

Even so, they do differ from one another in at least two ways.

A. Since the predicate of an empirical aesthetic judgment refers to a feeling, the judgment "must always remain purely subjective, and is absolutely incapable of forming a representation of an object".¹⁸ (CJ 206)

But what is denoted by the predicate of a judgment of perception is a secondary quality which Kant calls an "objective sensation" (as opposed to a "subjective sensation") which can become a "representation of an object", and so come to have a sort of objectivity.¹⁹ (CJ 206)

B. Taste judgments, as conceived by Kant, are not about sensations which are given to our sensibility such as warmth, sweetness, bitterness, and the like. A judgment which ascribes beauty to an object is a claim about the felt pleasure arising from the harmony between the cognitive faculties. Accordingly, taste judgments are essentially formal or, as Kant says, "pure" aesthetic judgments; and as such, their objects differ from those of perceptual judgments as per Kant's theoretical Critique.

Thus, the matters of sensation have no significant role to play in a judgment: the reference of a taste judgment is the form of the intuition. Accordingly, for Kant, the pure aesthetic judgment refers the intuition to cognition by referring the form to the general process of cognition and further by referring the resultant pleasure to the representation. The judgment that "this X is beautiful" predicates the specific kind of pleasure arising from the relating of the form of representation with the general feature of cognitive processes. And to the extent that reference is made between cognition in general and intuition, the taste judgment, by Kant's analysis, is universally communicable (among rational

human beings) because the formal processes involved with general cognition are the same universally.

This is similar to Kant's claim, in the Prolegomena, that the judgment of perception can also have universal validity:

The given intuition must be subsumed under a concept which determines the form of judging in general relatively to the intuition, connects empirical consciousness of intuition in consciousness in general, and thereby procures universal validity for empirical judgments.²⁰ (Prolegomena p.48)

Aside from the obvious difference, that judgments of perception require the employment of concepts while aesthetic judgments do not, the similarity between them with respect to the criterion of the establishment of universal validity is, in both cases, the reference to the common general characteristic of cognition.

The Harmony of the Cognitive Faculties

From what we have determined thus far in our inquiry, we can safely infer that, for Kant, the feeling of pleasure involved with a judgment of taste is a result of both specific sensation and an awareness of the harmony between the cognitive faculties. Assuming this to be acceptable, we may also infer that in a judgment of taste, it is not enough to be aware of mere sensations; for that would only result in a simple perceptual judgment. It is, therefore, also necessary that the agent be aware of the harmony between the imagination and the understanding. It would seem to follow then that prior to our coming to understand fully what special significance is attached to the felt pleasure in a taste judgment, we must become clear about the notion of harmony which Kant sees as the necessary condition for the emergence of the pleasure in the beautiful.

With the suggestion that the existing harmony between the cognitive faculties must be perceived (or felt), Kant is focusing our attention upon the notion of form. The harmony to which we have been referring is, I believe, nothing more than the conformity of the form of the given representation with the forms of intuition and mental activity in general. According to Kant, we (as humans) are wanting in any direct access to objects represented in perception. In view of Kant's theoretical Critique, the two forms of intuition, space and time, (as well as the categories), are necessary for human cognitive perception. Although we did see, in the preceding, that the categories are not requisite for all cases of perception, even aesthetic perceptions are dependent on the presence of the pure forms of intuition for their actualization.

If such a mediation by the pure forms were to be denied, our judgments, cognitive or otherwise, would be deprived of the means to escape an intractable subjectivity and contingency; for such judgments would merely be functions of the contingent relationships between objects and individual dispositions.

It is by virtue of this universal condition for perception in general that the manifold of sensations is made communicable and valid as judgments. Furthermore, it is precisely due to his capacity to communicate (certain kinds of feelings) that the agent's formal aesthetic judgment can be said to have subjective though imputable universality. As Kant expresses it:

the quickening of both faculties (imagination and understanding) to an indefinite, but yet, thanks to the given representation, harmonious activity, such as belongs to cognition generally, is the sensation whose universal

communicability is postulated by the judgment of taste.²¹
 (CJ 219)

But the soundness of Kant's argument in this regard must ultimately rest upon whether he can intelligibly and adequately distinguish the pure or formal aesthetic judgment from the judgment of cognition. This of course is the question of the possibility of aesthetic judgment with which we have begun this chapter.

We have already seen that there can be a certain kind of aesthetic judgment which has no reliance on the 'rules' of cognition. However, under closer scrutiny, this fact turns out not to be so helpful for solving Kant's problem. Since Kant does distinguish aesthetic judgments of sense from the pure aesthetic judgments, we must, in order to arrive at the solution for the problem, see whether or not the latter kind of judgments are indeed formed independently of the categories acting as the 'rules' for the unification of the manifold of sensations as per cognition.

It has been suggested that the harmony which is accompanied by the pleasure in the beautiful is the conformity of the form of the given representation with the forms of intuition and mental activity in general. Given that aesthetic judgments are, for Kant, reflective judgments, such a conformity cannot be a determinant one, that is, one which is restricted by the internal fetters of the understanding. At the same time, it cannot be that such a conformity has nothing whatever to do with the faculty of concepts. Thus, it now becomes crucial that the kind of independence ascribed to the reflective activity of the imagination be such that it is capable of avoiding either horn of the dilemma implied by the above:

i.e. the (aesthetic) imagination must, on the one hand, be free of the constraints of the understanding, and, on the other hand, still be related in such a way as to make the conformity possible. It is here, it seems, that Kant evidences his most creative ingenuity, by providing us with the notion of "free play" of the cognitive faculties.

Kant has argued that, that which is affirmed by an aesthetic judgment is the felt pleasure arising from the estimation or the contemplation of the form of the object of sense. And, since we are never given only a single, independent sensation, but a manifold of sensations which relate to one another in certain ways, the form of the object of sense can plausibly be understood as the particular way in which sensations are discovered to be related as a whole in the imagination.

Of course, for Kant, the relationship in question is the spatio-temporal relationship displayed by all aspects of the object of sense. In the case of cognition, these sensations and their relationships were seen to be synthesized according to categorial rules. In the case of aesthetic judgments, however, such syntheses are precluded, and hence, the relationships must be discovered as the content of the imagination in its "free play". Kant says that:

the aesthetic judgement in its estimate of the beautiful refers the imagination in its free play to the understanding, to bring out its agreement with the concepts²² of the latter in general (apart from their determination).²² (CJ 256)

What the imagination discovers, then, is the appropriateness of the way in which the manifold of sensations hang together (without syntheses) in the imagination so as to produce the feeling of delight in the subject. This appropriateness is nothing other than the felt conformity of

the 'unity' in the manifold with the faculty of concepts which, though the latter had no active part in producing the combination, nevertheless displays a kind of agreement that it would have had if it were brought into play. Thus, in the "free play" of the imagination, the first horn of dilemma is dissolved because the discovered 'unity' is not seen as a product of the imaginative understanding exerting its categorical rules.

For many who are familiar with the arguments in Kant's first Critique but are yet unsure about his claims concerning taste judgments (pure aesthetic judgments), the ramifications of the above quoted passage present a particular difficulty. According to Kant of the theoretical Critique, the manifold of sensations cannot strictly be considered as a manifold until the imaginative synthesis has brought together the particular sensations into a whole. But, given that this 'bringing together' of the plurality of sensations is the job of the imagination acting in accordance with the understanding, how is one to view Kant's later claim that a manifold (already displaying its wholeness) is discoverable within the imagination?

First of all, our concern is with the way sensations 'hang together' and not with the sensations themselves. Also, by the idea that the form in the manifold is discoverable in the imagination, Kant seems to mean that it is a sort of an offering of the particular image in the imagination to the gaze of the faculty of the forms of thought which is the understanding. Thus, by allowing the understanding to assume a rather passive role, Kant allows himself to deny, in this case, the objection that the form itself is subsumed under a concept or determined

by the harnessing grip of the active understanding. Finally, it should be pointed out that, at this stage, the 'unity' with which we are dealing does not involve any concepts so that the function of the imagination in its 'free play' has no bearing on what kind of judgment (i.e. reflective or determinant) is to result. The imaginative capacity of the mind simply unifies the manifold in its "freedom" from conceptual constraints.

Be that as it may, it seems instructive to make the following observations. On the one hand, it is less problematic, with regards to cognition, to claim that there is a harmonious accordance between the imagination and the understanding; for as we have already seen, the imagination was found to be an aspect of the understanding. On the other hand, the claim that in the case of taste judgments these cognitive faculties are also in mutual accord as far as their activities are concerned is a little more complicated than the first and requires a further elaboration.

What makes the matter complex is precisely the idea that the imagination can freely accord in its activity with that of the understanding without the 'guidance' of the law of thought, i.e. what Kant calls the "free conformity to law of the imagination".²³ (CJ 240 Kant's emphasis.) As Kant himself points out, however, "that the imagination should be both free and of itself conformable to law, i.e. carry autonomy with it, is a contradiction" since "the understanding alone gives the law".²³ (CJ 240) It is in order to solve this difficulty that Kant offers the imagination which is able to provide freely the forms of the representation which would have resulted had the understanding been brought into

play. Thus, the oft quoted expression "conformity to law without law" or "a subjective harmonizing of the imagination and the understanding without an objective one".²⁵ (CJ 241) Also, it is the resulting sensation felt as pleasure that is expressed by the predicate "beautiful" in a judgment of taste. It follows, then, that in a judgment of taste, the estimation of the object precedes the pleasure in the object. And this is quite consistent with the claim made in the ninth section of the "Analytic of the Beautiful".

In the same light, it appears that Kant conceives the taste judgment to be subjective; and it has as its "determining ground" what he refers to as the "mental state that presents itself in the mutual relation of the powers of representation".²⁶ (CJ 217) These powers are later identified with the cognitive powers which are introduced into the scene by the given representation. According to Kant, once they are so introduced,

the cognitive powers...are here engaged in a free play, since no definite concept restricts them to a particular rule of cognition. Hence the mental state in this representation must be one of feeling of the free play of the powers of representation in a given representation for a cognition in general.²⁷ (CJ 217)

Accordingly, Kant later adds that:

...since the freedom of the imagination consists precisely in the fact that it schematises without a concept, the judgement of taste must found upon a mere sensation of the mutually quickening activity of the imagination in its freedom, and of the understanding with its conformity to law. It must therefore rest upon a feeling that allows the object to be estimated by the finality of the representation (by which an object is given) for the furtherance of the cognitive faculties in their free play.²⁸ (CJ 287)

Since Kant conceives the two cognitive faculties as engaged in a harmonious "free play", the suggestion that the imagination in its estimating activity could have no relationship with the understanding, (which was our second horn of dilemma), is also disoluble with the notion of "conformity to law without law". Kant argues that:

since no concept of the Object underlies the judgement here, it can consist only in the subsumption of the imagination itself (in the case of a representation whereby an object is given) under the conditions enabling the understanding in general to advance from the intuition to concepts.²⁹ (CJ 287)

Thus, for Kant, it is not that there is no "subsumption" involved with an aesthetic judgment (which is also a reflective judgment) at all. Rather, the kind of subsumption referred to here is one of the imagination itself.

Generally speaking, what is meant by the term "subsumption" is a bringing of something under a rule, a class or a category. In this case, Kant is careful to avoid contradiction by claiming that the imagination itself is subsumed under the "conditions" of cognition in general, not under any concept nor any rule. This is consistent with our earlier observation that the aesthetic estimation of the object conforms with the process of cognition up to the final stage wherein a concept is applied to the unified sensations.

Systematicity, Universality and the Sensus Communis

With respect to the specific problem of concept formation dealt with in the first Critique, a different interpretation seems to remain open for us. For one thing, although the actual processes involved with such an estimation are not, in a strict sense, identical with those of

cognition, the resulting conformity is one which is at least analogous to that of cognition. As noted earlier, Kant, in his First Introduction to the Critique of Judgement, says that:

the totality of nature as the sum of all objects of experience forms a system according to transcendental laws, which the understanding itself gives a priori to appearances....³⁰ (FI 208)

Clearly, in the case of cognition, Kant wishes to claim that there must be a systematicity in the manifold albeit a result of a conformity to the understanding's own transcendental laws or principles.

Similarly, in the case of the aesthetic, Kants states that:

The aesthetic judgement, on the other hand, refers the representation, by which an Object is given, solely to the Subject, and brings to our notice no quality of the object, but only the final form in the determination of the powers of representation engaged upon it.³¹ (CJ 228 My emphasis.)

It is, according to Kant, upon the occasion of this "final" (or as Bernard perceptively translates, "purposive") form of the representation that the harmony of the cognitive faculties finds its genesis. Without such a "finality" of the object, no amount of reflection or contemplation upon the object can discover the mutual accord between the imagination and the understanding. In other words, the fittingness of the representation of the object to the activities of the cognitive faculties is the "finality" or the "purposiveness" to which Kant refers. It would seem to follow then, that the form of the object must, at first, be such that it is appropriate for the exercise of the cognitive faculties.

Thus, in aesthetic judgment too, the implicit presupposition is that the manifold of sensations elicited by the object displays a 'syste-

maticity' (a purposive form) which the imagination, acting in accordance with its own principle, forms out of the manifold so as to make possible the exercise of the cognitive faculties. If this is acceptable, it would leave open a further claim that the kind of estimation which takes place at the level of the aesthetic may be called a 'prelude' to cognition in general. That is to say, the estimation of the object is, in one sense, what must take place prior to the first 'movement' of general cognition.

A difficulty here is that the feeling of pleasure in the beautiful is not given in intuition, and hence, no advancement toward concepts is entailed by a judgment of taste. But, in terms of the way Kant expresses his thoughts in the above quoted passage, the conditions for the advancement seem, nevertheless, necessary for the reflective functioning of the imagination culminating in a judgment of taste. How, then, are we to understand the notion of "conditions" so as to avoid confusing the aesthetic with cognitive judgments? As Kant suggests:

The subjective condition of all judgement is the judging faculty itself, or judgement. Employed in respect of a representation whereby an object is given, this requires the harmonious accordance of two powers of representation. These are, the imagination (for the intuition and the arrangement of the manifold of intuition), and the understanding (for the concept as a representation of the unity of this arrangement).³² (CJ 287)

The condition in question, therefore, is ascribed, by Kant to the faculty of judgment itself or, as the German Urteilkraft implies, the power of judgment. Accordingly, the difficulty of interpreting the notion of the subsumption of the imagination itself becomes less problematic if we keep in mind that, for Kant, the requisite principle of taste is the "subjective principle of the general power of judgement".³³ (CJ 286) It must be

a subjective principle because, as Kant says, "an objective principle of taste is not possible", since, "the determining ground" of a taste judgment can only be found in the "reflection of the Subject upon his own state (of pleasure and displeasure), to the exclusion of precepts and rules".³⁷ (CJ 285) This is why Kant concludes that:

Taste, then, as a subjective power of judgement, contains a principle of subsumption, not of intuitions under concepts, but of the faculty of intuitions or presentations, i.e. of the imagination, under the faculty of concepts, i.e. the understanding, so far as the former in its freedom accords with the latter in its conformity to law.³⁵ (CJ 287 Kant's emphasis.)

In a judgment of taste, we encounter no "definite objective principle", and this is true for Kant. But he does claim that a taste judgment has an "unconditioned necessity".³⁶ (CJ 237) If such a judgment had no principles at all, it would remain rudderless and contingent. For Kant, therefore, there is required in every taste judgment a "subjective principle". This subjective principle, which for Kant assumes the name of "common sense" (Sensus communis), "determines what pleases or displeases, by means of feeling only and not through concepts, but yet with universal validity".³⁷ (CJ 238) Moreover, according to Kant, it is the taste judgment which postulates the universality of the claim that an object 'X' is beautiful:

The quickening of both faculties (imagination and understanding) to an indefinite, but yet, thanks to the given representation, harmonious activity, such as belongs to cognition generally, is the sensation whose universal communicability is postulated by the judgement of taste.³⁸ (CJ 219)

If this is affirmed, then the activity of the imagination in the aesthetic estimation need not be considered as situated outside the realm

of the "conditions enabling the understanding in general to advance from the intuition to concepts". And, as such, it would then be a short step to the claim that the imagination itself is subsumed or 'brought under' such conditions. From this, moreover, would follow that, since the term "judgement" is defined in terms of "subsumption" (in Kant's theoretical Critique), the aesthetic judgment can legitimately be regarded as a judgment.

In addition, it would appear that such "conditions" are more than mere analogues of their cognitive counter-parts. As Kant proceeds in his explication, the analogy between the aesthetic estimation and cognition becomes increasingly stronger to the point that Kant would have us believe that these conditions are actually shared by both kinds of 'experiences'.

As we have discerned in the preceding segments, Kant's contention is that there are aesthetic judgments which postulates that the sensations are communicable universally among human beings. Moreover, such judgments are imputable to others a priori, i.e. the claim that the connection between the felt pleasure and the specific object of estimation expressed by the judgment of taste is valid a priori for everyone. But by this, of course, Kant does not mean to suggest that everyone does indeed agree, but that they ought to agree that the pleasure or displeasure is felt when one contemplates a particular representation of an object: "The assertion is not that every one will fall in with our judgement, but rather that every one ought to agree with it." (CJ 239)

Kant also states that:

...by a judgement of taste (upon the beautiful) the delight in an object is imputed to everyone, yet without being founded

on a concept (for then it would be the good), and...this claim to universality is such an essential factor of a judgement by which we describe anything as beautiful, that were it not for its being present to the mind it would never enter into anyone's head to use this expression, but everything that pleased without a concept would be ranked as agreeable.⁴⁰ (CJ 214)

It is because Kant conceives taste as the power of judging by means of pleasure (arising from the estimation of the object) that he ascribes universal validity to it.⁴¹ (CJ 190) The judgment concerned with the notion of the "good" (i.e. the moral feeling) results not from the free conformity to law but rather from the determination of the will by the principle: "it requires a determinate concept of law: whereas the pleasure in taste has to be connected immediately with the simple estimate prior to any concept".⁴² (CJ 289)

Thus, the universal validity attributed to a taste judgment ought not be interpreted as referring to the pleasure in a "given singular empirical representation". Rather, for Kant:

in a judgement of taste, what is represented a priori as a universal rule for the judgement and as valid for everyone, is not the pleasure but the universal validity of this pleasure perceived, as it is, to be combined in the mind with the mere estimate of an object.⁴³ (CJ 289)

And, further Kant says that:

A judgement to the effect that it is with pleasure that I perceive and estimate some object is an empirical judgement. But if it asserts that I think the object beautiful, i.e. that I may attribute that delight to every one as necessary, it is then an a priori judgement.⁴⁴ (CJ 289)

The judgment of taste, therefore, (in step with the main concern of the first Critique), is also a synthetic judgment a priori (since the subjective harmony is nothing that is given in the manifold).

A sceptic may, even at this point, object that it is not enough to say that we rational humans share a common mode of cognition in order to support the claim that taste judgments are "imputable"; for according to Kant, judgments of taste are non-cognitive. To such a charge Kant would offer the following as a reply:

The propaedeutic to all fine arts, so far as the highest degree of its perfection is what is in view, appears to lie, not in precepts, but in the culture of the mental powers produced by a sound preparatory education in what are called the humaniora--so called, presumably, because humanity signifies, on the one hand, the universal feeling of sympathy, and, on the other, the faculty of being able to communicate universally one's inmost self--properties constituting in conjunction the befitting social spirit of mankind, in contradistinction to the narrow life of the lower animals.⁴⁵ (CJ 355 Kant's emphasis.)

It is evident, then, that Kant sees as necessary a combination of two essential components for the claim of the universal imputability of taste judgments, i.e. the ability to sympathize with the pleasure or displeasure felt by others, together with the ability for general cognition. These are, according to Kant, both constituents of our "common sense" (Sensus communis). Kant says that, "the subjective necessity attributed to a judgement of taste is conditional", and that, "the condition of the necessity advanced by a judgement of taste is the idea of common sense".⁴⁶ (CJ 237) (Note that Kant does distinguish this notion from what he calls the "common understanding" which is the cognitive counter-part of the Sensus communis.)

In saying this, we should not be so careless as to make the mistake of hypostatizing the notion of Sensus communis. As Kant cautions us:

The judgement of taste, therefore, depends on our presupposing the existence of a common sense. (But this is not to

be taken to mean some external sense, but the effect arising from the free play of our powers of cognition.⁴⁷ (CJ 238 My emphasis.)

But, if it is "the effect arising from the free play of the powers of cognition", the sensus communis must be seen as having the same status as the pleasure and displeasure, i.e. it must be a result of the harmony or disharmony between the imagination and the understanding. And such a result can be nothing other than a feeling of pleasure or displeasure. Because it is also tied in with the notion of "sympathy", the feeling grounded in common sense can come to have the universality of a public validity. However, this is, nevertheless, a "presupposition" which, as Kant has shown, is a subjectively necessary condition for the communicability of all our judgments:

we assume a common sense as a necessary condition of the universal communicability of our knowledge, which is presupposed in every logic and every principle of knowledge that is not one of scepticism.⁴⁸ (CJ 239)

Thus, we are led back to our earlier claim that the principle of reflective judgment is not an empirical one: It is not attributable to experience; because it is subjective, it is a product of human reason (i.e. Judgment) and is presupposed in all experience.

Just as the universal laws which determine nature and the intelligibility of the empirical laws were found to be presupposed in cognition, the taste judgment presupposes the principle of Sensus communis which insures the communicability and the imputability of the exercise of the faculty of taste. And, it is by virtue of such a presupposition that in making a taste judgment, we are able to proceed as though beauty and sublimity were some objective quality of the object.

Having thus presented the main currents of Kant's theory of taste, I shall proceed with an examination of some of the relevant aspects of a counter thesis as discernible from David Hume's essay "On The Standard of Taste". This comparison, I believe, is helpful for a number of reasons. For one thing, in making this provision, a certain amount of one-sidedness may be avoided. For another, and more to the point, I believe that it is generally agreed among scholars that some significant and valuable insights are available from a comparison of Kant's philosophical position with that of Hume. This seems undeniable with respect to the epistemological stance of each and also, with respect to their respective aesthetic theories. I take the legitimacy of this assumption to be given and obvious from the contents of the following segments, and hence, no arguments will be given in this regard. However, since my first and foremost concern in this thesis is to arrive at a clearer understanding of the significance of Kant's theory of the "aesthetic", a divergent view such as that of Hume seems appropriate for the isolation of some of the crucial considerations. Let us begin with a view of Hume's empirical approach.

FOOTNOTES FOR CHAPTER TWO

1. I. Kant, Critique of Judgment, tr. J.C. Meredith, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1980, 203. I shall, hereafter, refer to this volume by the initials 'CJ'; and the number which follows indicates the page number of the Academie edition which Meredith supplies in his margins.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid., 204.
4. Ibid., 218.
5. Ibid., 287.
6. Ibid., 205.
7. Ibid., 209-210.
8. Ibid., 209.
9. Ibid., 211.
10. Ibid., 216-217.
11. D. Crawford, Kant's Aesthetic Theory, The University of Wisconsin Press, Madison 1974.
12. Ibid., p.74.
13. Op.cit., 241.
14. I. Kant, Prolegomena to any Future Metaphysics, tr. L.W. Beck, Bobbs-Merrill Co. Inc., New York, 1950, p.46.
15. Ibid., p.47.
16. Kant, CPR, B164-165.
17. Op.cit., p.49.
18. Kant, CJ, 206.

- 19 Ibid.
20. Kant, Prolegomena, p.48.
21. Kant, CJ, 219.
22. Ibid., 256.
23. Ibid., 240.
24. Ibid.
25. Ibid., 241.
26. Ibid., 217.
27. Ibid.
28. Ibid., 287.
29. Ibid.
30. Kant, FI, 208.
31. Kant, CJ, 228.
32. Ibid., 287.
33. Ibid., 286.
34. Ibid., 285.
35. Ibid., 287.
36. Ibid., 237.
37. Ibid., 238.
38. Ibid., 219.
39. Ibid., 239.
40. Ibid., 214.
41. Ibid., 190.
42. Ibid., 289.
43. Ibid.
44. Ibid.

45. Ibid., 355.

46. Ibid., 237.

47. Ibid., 238.

48. Ibid., 239.

CHAPTER THREE

THE NOTION OF A STANDARD OF TASTE

Hume

Hume's position is, without doubt, one of empiricism. To begin with, Hume held that our knowledge is derived, in its entirety, from experience, and hence, our reason cannot furnish us with certainty about anything. In accordance with this sceptical outlook, Hume's positive philosophy was one of explicating how we come to have certain beliefs about ourselves and our environment.

An aesthetic judgment, for Hume, closely resembles a moral judgment. In the case of moral judgments, the functions of reason and feelings or sentiments are such that reason can only show us the means; and it is the sentiment which selects the ends. As the cavalier dictum in his A Treatise of Human Nature states: "Reason is and ought only to be a slave of the passions, and can never pretend to any other office than to serve and obey them".¹ (T p.415) Also, at the end of his An Inquiry Concerning Human Understanding, Hume reiterates what he takes to be the "proper" realm of ethics and aesthetics by asserting that:

Morals and criticism are not so properly objects of the understanding as of taste and sentiment. Beauty, whether moral or natural, is felt, more properly than perceived. Or if we reason concerning it, and endeavour to fix its standard, we regard a new fact, to wit, the general taste of mankind, or some such ²fact, which may be the object of reasoning and enquiry.

In accordance with this, Hume later adds in his Enquiry Concerning The Principles Of Morals that:

after every circumstance, every relation is known, the understanding has no further room to operate, nor any object on which it could employ itself.³

Thus, for Hume, in the case of moral as well as aesthetic judgments, once the reason has ascertained the facts to the best of its ability, the supervision of sentiment (or taste) is needed to produce the idea of value. And, such an idea is expressive of the agent's response to the "facts" and denotes nothing objective.

In addition, Hume maintains that the perspectives of moral and aesthetic judgments are general, whereas Kant has argued that any judgment of taste must be a singular judgment. For Hume, aesthetic (and moral) judgments are not expressive of actual feelings or sentiments which are contingent upon specific circumstances. In his well known essay, "On the Standard of Taste", Hume suggests that beauty is not a property of the object itself, and hence, a taste judgment is expressive of the mind's response to the object. However, since Hume believes that there is a uniformity of human nature, taste is thought to be universal at least among certain connoisseur judges.

Hume, in order to set up the problem concerning taste, begins by observing that there are disagreements among men about taste. What he intends in his "On the Standard of Taste", is to demonstrate that such disputes arise from the contingent features of the agents' circumstances. Relying upon the counterintuitiveness of the sceptical view of taste, Hume argues for its dismissal through the following example:

Whoever would assert an equality of genius and elegance between Ogilby and Milton, or Bunyan and Addison, would be thought to defend no less an extravagance, than if he had maintained a molehill to be as high as Teneriffe, or a pond as extensive as the ocean.⁴ (ST 7)

And, he adds that disputants of this view are to be ignored and their "sentiment" should be pronounced to be "absurd and ridiculous".⁵ (ST 7)

Thus, it was Hume's problem to determine how one may, on the one hand, claim that judgments of taste are a matter of sentiment, and on the other hand, avoid the sceptical conclusion based on the relativity of taste which would preclude the possibility of there being any standard of taste or "the rules of composition".

Early in his essay, Hume observes that "none of the rules of composition are fixed by reasonings a priori, or can be esteemed abstract conclusions of the understanding".⁶ (ST 7) With this denial of reasoning a priori as having the power to intuit beauty or to ground the standard of taste, Hume asserts that:

Their foundation is the same with that of all the practical sciences, experience; nor are they any thing but general observations, concerning what has been universally found to please in all countries and in all ages. (ST 7)

The problem of the 'correctness' of taste judgments thus made normative, its solution, for Hume, is to be found through an empirical investigation of taste as it is manifested in history. And the most striking contrast with Kant's theory of taste is displayed in this empirical methodology which Hume employs.

Hume does, however, delimit his "experiment" by imposing various conditions which would insure its authenticity and validity. He writes:

When we would make an experiment of this nature, and would

try the force of any beauty or deformity, we must choose with care a proper time and place, and bring the fancy to a suitable situation and disposition. A perfect serenity of mind, a recollection of thought, a due attention to the object; if any of these circumstances be wanting, our experiment will be fallacious, and we shall⁸ be unable to judge of the catholic and universal beauty. (ST 8-9 My emphasis.)

But as it may be pointed out, these conditions do not assure us of the success of his "experiment"; for as Hume himself acknowledges:

Though the principles of taste be universal, and nearly, if not entirely, the same in all men; yet few are qualified to give judgment on any work of art, or establish their own sentiment as the standard of beauty. (ST 17)

And he adds further that: "When the critic has no delicacy, he judges without any distinction".¹⁰ (ST 17 My emphasis.)

Here arises a difficulty concerning Hume's reliance upon a "true judge" or a group of such judges to give us assurance that a given taste judgment is 'correct' or 'incorrect'. More specifically, the problem is one of determining why we should accept a verdict of a "true judge" as necessary. It is true, I think (along with Cohen,¹¹ Kivy¹² and the like), that Hume does not offer a satisfactory answer to this question. And it is with respect to this question, that Kant offers his insightful and forceful reply. Let us procede to view the general content of Hume's thesis concerning judgments of taste.

It is generally agreed, among commentators, that Hume is subscribing to what has come to be called the 'ideal observer theory' or, as Prof. Cohen calls it, the "ideal creature" theory. In effect, this kind of theory is an analysis of a statement consisting of a subject, a copula 'is', and a predicate; and Cohen, in giving a generic description, offers

us two specific forms: "'x is ϕ ' and 'x is (or would be) sanctioned by an ideal creature'".¹³ (Cohen I p.1)

By affirming that beauty is not any objective property of a thing, Hume has precluded the acceptability of a direct investigation of the object thought to be beautiful: i.e. the judgment that x is beautiful is not the sort of judgment which can be identified with statements such as 'x is green' or 'x is light'. Thus, as Cohen aptly puts it, Hume "transfers" the question of beauty from the object itself to the agent who responds to it in a particular fashion: "The question is whether H's [the agent's] reaction can be taken as a standard, or a part of a standard, and this depends upon whether H is a true judge".¹⁴ (Cohen II p.2) Thus, for Hume, even if the determination of whether an object is beautiful is a matter of "sentiment", we may license such judgments by determining whether the agent is a "true judge"; and this is a matter of fact. Hume's contention then, is that given that the circumstantial conditions are satisfied, a judgment of the "true judge" would be a 'correct' one, or at least, a joint verdict of such judges would be 'correct', in so far as it represents the "true standard of taste". What makes one a "true judge", and how can we recognize him? Hume says that:

a true judge in the finer arts is observed, even during the most polished ages, to be so rare a character: strong sense, united to delicate sentiment, improved by practice, perfected by comparison, and cleared of all prejudice, can alone entitle critics to this valuable character; and the joint verdict of such, wherever they are to be found, is the true standard of taste and beauty.¹⁵ (ST 17 My emphasis.)

But, in all this, Hume is presupposing two things, i.e. that the notion of "the true standard of taste and beauty" is intelligible; and

that such a "standard" does indeed exist. The two presuppositions are mutually dependent and stem from a further presupposition that:

Though it be certain that beauty and deformity, more than sweet and bitter, are not qualities in objects, but belong entirely to the sentiment, internal or external, it must be allowed, that there are certain qualities in objects which are fitted by nature to produce those particular feelings.¹⁶ (ST 11 My emphasis.)

Thus, for Hume, without these "certain qualities in objects", their effects in the agent, namely pleasure and pain, cannot be given in experience. Since Hume takes such qualities (whatever they turn out to be) as given to the discernment of the agent's "mental taste", what he calls the "delicacy of taste" is the function of the degree to which this faculty of taste has been refined through the cultivation of the five characteristics of what makes a "true judge".

The standard of taste as developed by Hume, however, is not applicable in all cases. According to Hume, there are certain 'natural propensities' attributed to age and temperment, which makes the determination of the standard of taste impossible when they are involved in the exercise of taste. But, Hume thinks that:

Such performances are innocent and unavoidable, and can never reasonably be the object of dispute, because there is no standard by which they can be decided.¹⁷ (ST 20)

The fact that there can be, and are such diversities in tastes of people seems not to have any pernicious implications for Hume's theory; for the requisite circumstantial conditions Hume has placed on his experiment do not extend themselves to the 'natural propensities' over which the agent has no control.

Hume's conclusions, then, can be summarized as the following.

Beauty and deformity are sentiments or feelings which are connected to certain unspecified "qualities in objects" by virtue of our natural human makeup. It is, thus, possible to claim objectivity and universality of a taste judgment made by a "true judge" (or by a group of such judges) because it is he/they who are in the position to perceive/feel the connection between the particular sentiment and the quality.

Even if Hume is right in his conclusions, it is another matter to decide whether or not a qualified judge's verdict is necessarily 'correct'. That is to say, Hume has not, I believe, provided us with an adequate account of the nature of taste judgments such that we would be assured that, barring the kinds of exceptions mentioned above, the verdict of Hume's "true judge" is indeed representative of the true standard of taste. Hume may be justified in his claim that the question of whether or not an agent is indeed a "true judge" is a matter of fact subject to an empirical investigation. But this is not adequate supporting evidence for the further claim regarding the 'necessity' of the true judge's verdict since the judgment that something is beautiful remains a matter of feelings. It would appear that unless Hume can offer an intelligible account of why it is that the verdict of the true judge (or their joint verdict) is compelling for the rest of us, his notion of the "standard of taste" seems to be philosophically empty. Although more needs to be said about this subject in order to do Hume justice, I shall defer it for later consideration. I believe that by now, we have isolated enough about Hume's theory of taste to make a comparison with that of Kant meaningful as well as worthwhile. To this end, I shall proceed to consider in what

sense Kant can be seen as offering a "standard" of taste.

Kant and Hume

It is *prima facie* evident that in providing us with the deduction of the universality (though subjective) of pure aesthetic judgments, Kant has also provided us with a forceful argument as to the 'correctness' of taste judgments. To the extent that he does so, Kant is also, in some sense, offering a "standard" of taste.

Within the context of this thesis, I think that the sense in which Kant can be seen as arguing for the intelligibility of the notion of such a 'standard' is discernible from the following. The beautiful, as conceived by Kant, is not any property or quality of the object represented.¹⁸ (CJ 228) And, this presumption is congruous with that of Hume. However, their agreement soon turns out to be merely superficial. To Kant's mind, the claim to beauty, a taste judgment, is essentially different from a mere reporting of pleasant sensation in the agent. For, such a reporting expresses the "agreeableness" which holds between the object and the agent himself, exclusively. And as such, it is neither disinterested in the existence of the object (because the implicit reference to a gratification must presuppose its existence), nor does such a claim have the capacity to extend itself through an imputation (so as to establish its universality). And these two characteristics are, to my mind, the most important ones for distinguishing the construal of taste judgments between Kant and Hume. I shall deal with these two features of Kant's theory, though briefly, so that the road is paved for our understanding of what Kant can mean by a 'standard' as applied to

taste judgments.

That Kant couples the notion of 'agreeableness' with the assumption that the subject possesses a particular interest in the existence of the object which gives him pleasure is quite clear in the following passage.

Now, that a judgement on an object by which its agreeableness is affirmed, expresses an interest in it, is evident from the fact that through sensation it provokes a desire for similar objects, consequently the delight presupposes, not the simple judgement about it, but the bearing its real existence has upon my state so far as affected by such an Object. Hence we not merely say¹⁹ of the agreeable that it pleases, but that it gratifies. (CJ 207 Kant's emphasis.)

According to Kant, therefore, since a taste judgment does not have any interest in the real existence of the object represented, it cannot be identified with a judgment of the agreeable. It follows then, that a judgment that something is beautiful cannot involve a gratification of a particular desire, for Kant.

Moreover, Kant adds that:

The green colour of the meadows belongs to objective sensation as the perception of an object of sense; but its agreeableness to subjective sensation, by which an object is represented: i.e. to feeling through which the object is regarded as an Object of delight (which involves no cognition of the object).²⁰ (CJ 206 Kant's emphasis.)

Since a judgment expressing the agreeableness of an object "involves no cognition of the object", it is rightly an aesthetic judgment in Kant's sense of the term. In addition, since such a feeling is not given in objective sensation, i.e. in perception, the "agreeableness" cannot be a property of the object as such. Thus, aesthetic judgments can neither involve any recognition of properties (concepts) nor any function (pur-

pose) attributed to the object.

In this regard, we should note that Kant's notion of taste judgments alternately involves analogous notions of principles and purposiveness, both of which are grounded in the agent's subjectivity. Kant's theory, therefore, does not make available any publicly accessible 'standard' or 'rule' with which a taste judgment can be measured. If there were such a 'standard', then, according to Kant, the judgment cannot be aesthetic and so not one of taste either--it would be a sort of cognitive judgment. However, it seems to me that Kant was not concerned with the problem of establishing the kind of standard which Hume was attempting to establish. It is evident that at least a part of the Humean endeavour concerning tastes of men was to arrive at a publicly confirmable rule or standard.

I believe, that it is more fruitful to view Kant's investigation of the nature of aesthetic judgments as a means which he employs to elucidate the possibility of there being a way to make the object intelligible independently of cognition. And this is what was unaccounted for in the Critique of Pure Reason where his grounding of the cognitive process left us wanting in the justification of how it is that "experience in general" can be seen as "a system under transcendental laws of the understanding, and not as an aggregate".²¹ (FI 209)

Nevertheless, Kant does not ignore the commonly understood sense of taste with which Hume was concerned and the idea of 'good taste' is related. But Kant argues that the common or ordinary notion of taste and the related standard of 'good taste' at least implicitly embrace the concept or the purpose of the phenomenal object. For Kant, "a judgement

of taste by which an object is described as beautiful under the condition of a definite concept is not pure".²² (CJ 229) A proper judgment of taste, according to Kant, is a "pure aesthetic judgement". Thus, I believe, that his discussion regarding the two kinds of beauty reflects a twofold intention of the author, i.e. to offer a criticism of the Humean view of taste and to reinforce Kant's own construal of taste judgments.

The sixteenth section of the third Critique begins with the distinction between "free" and "dependent" beauty:

There are two kinds of beauty: free beauty (pulchritudo vaga), or beauty which is merely dependent (pulchritudo adhaerens). The first presupposes no concept of what the object should be; the second does presuppose such a concept and, with it, an answering perfection of the object. Those of the first kind are said to be (self-subsisting) beauties of this thing or that thing; the other kind of beauty, being attached to a concept (conditioned beauty), is ascribed to objects which come under the concept of a particular end.²³ (CJ 229)

Thus, with the "pure" aesthetic judgment corresponds the "free beauty" because there does not exist any "intellectualized delight" accompanying the judgment. But in the case where the dependent or "conditioned" beauty is judged, such an 'intellectual' pleasure is present since the awareness of what kind of an object X is, or ought to be, is inherent within this type of a 'taste' judgment.

It should be agreed that Hume's investigation has shown at least that questions of taste are not solvable by discursive means, and that any reliance on authoritative taste leads us to an intractable problem of furnishing an adequate justification. And this is a result of Hume's supposition that the "delicacy of taste" is a contingent asset of the agent like the discerning palate of a wine taster. That is to say, if

we were to construe taste from a Humean perspective, the meaning or the essence of the notion becomes obscured as something other than a natural human faculty possessed by everyone. Thus, the possibility of becoming an empirical universal is precluded from the destiny of the so called "good taste". As Kant says:

There can be no objective rule of taste by which what is beautiful may be defined by means of concepts....It is only throwing away labour to look for a principle of taste that affords a universal criterion of the beautiful by definite concepts; because what is sought is a thing impossible and inherently contradictory. But in the universal communicability of the sensation (of delight or aversion)--a communicability, too, that exists apart from any concept--in the accord, so far as possible, of all ages and nations as to this feeling in the representation of certain objects, we have the empirical criterion, weak indeed and scarce sufficient to raise a presumption, of the derivation of a taste, thus confirmed by examples, from grounds deep-seated and shared alike by all men, underlying their agreement in estimating the forms under which objects are given to them.²⁴ (CJ 231-232)

From this, Kant declares that, "taste must be an original faculty", and that "some products of taste are looked upon as exemplary".²⁵ (CJ 232 Kant's emphasis.) But, this sense of being "exemplary" is not one of being a model for imitation but rather is synonymous with the notion of a paradigmatic rule. And, since the faculty of taste is, for Kant, "an original faculty", we need not worry that such a paradigm would determine the former's activities.

What, for Kant, can be a 'standard' of taste, therefore, is essentially related to this notion that a singular judgment of taste is "exemplary" or paradigmatic of the universal rule of taste. According to Kant, "what we have in mind in the case of the beautiful is a necessary reference on its part to delight".²⁶ (CJ 236 Kant's emphasis.) But, it is a

"special kind" of necessity: Since it is "thought in an aesthetic judgment, it can only be termed exemplary". Kant expands on this by arguing that:

it is necessity of the assent of all to a judgement regarded as exemplifying a universal rule of incapable of formulation. Since an aesthetic judgement is not an objective or cognitive judgement, this necessity is not derivable from definite concepts, and so is not apodictic. Much less is it inferable from universality of experience (of a thorough-going agreement of judgements about beauty of a certain object.²⁷ (CJ 237)

It is thus quite transparent that, for Kant, the Humean conception of the "standard of taste" is impossible, and hence, it must ultimately be a misnomer, since no judgments concerning matters of fact "afford any foundation for a concept of the necessity of these judgements".²⁸ (CJ 237)

Kant's aesthetic judgment, thus seen as "a special faculty of estimating according to a rule, but not according to concepts",²⁹ (CJ 194), admits as a 'standard' precisely this "rule" of estimation, i.e. the Sensus Communis, the principle through which the communicability and the imputability of taste is grounded. However, since this principle is "incapable of formulation", the only acceptable sense in which Kant can be seen as affirming a 'standard of taste' seems to be implicit in the fact that Kant regards each singular taste judgment, that is the pure aesthetic judgment, as a paradigm of the Sensus Communis.

It still remains for us to discuss certain questions involving the notion of 'correctness' in judgments of taste. From what has preceeded thus far, it is clear that in one sense, Kant's kind of taste judgments must be 'correct', and hence, imputable because the requisite conditions (when satisfied) leave the agent in a realm that is common to all ration-

al human beings. The judgment which arises is "necessary".

In this regard, some commentators, e.g. Cohen, have criticized Kant by saying that Kant's kind of judge, who makes a pure judgment of taste, "removes all those characteristics of his intelligence and feeling which could distinguish him from any other person", and thus is committed to "an absolutely minimal conception" of taste judgment which would ultimately "rule out the possibility that two pure judgements of taste (of the same object) differ".³⁰ (Cohen II pp.6-9)

There are two points I would like to raise in defense of Kant's theory. The first point is that, while Cohen is quite right in pointing out that Kant's judge is difficult to distinguish from any other person, I believe that what the latter has said about the faculty of Judgment must be considered. This faculty is, according to Kant: "A peculiar talent which can be practised only, and cannot be taught. It is the specific quality of so-called mother-wit; and its lack no school can make good."³¹ (A133/B172) And Kant has made it clear that not all people are equally gifted in this regard. The second point is elliptically related to the first. Again, Cohen may very well be right in saying that Kant cannot "afford an assumption so strong that it rules out the possibility" of a dispute between two judgments of taste pertaining to the same object. However, I do not believe that Kant is in disagreement with this observation. Nor do I think that Kant is committed to it in any pernicious way. As I have argued in the preceding, Kant's judgment of taste has, as its object, the pleasure arising from the contemplation of the representation of the object, and hence, it is not a judgment that can have any objectiv-

ity (not even in the normative sense of objective). It is, I believe, evident from the emphasis Cohen places on the notion of the "same object", that he is tacitly affirming the possibility of there being 'objectivity' of one kind or another with respect to taste judgments. But, for Kant, given that the two separate statements are about the same representation of the object, and given also that they are both "pure" aesthetic judgments, the possible dispute between them can only be due to one of two things: 1) at least one of the two judges A or B is 'wit-less', i.e. lacking in judgment, or 2) at least one of A or B is mistaken about the 'purity' of his/their judgment(s). And of course, if it is the second case, then the judgment cannot be a) about the same representation, or b) a "pure" aesthetic one in Kant's sense of the term.

But, in claiming this, Kant does not close the possibility of two individual judgments differing from one another pertaining to the 'same' object. It is quite possible, I think even for Kant, for there to be two different representations which are given to the agent as aspects or profiles of the particular phenomenal object. In such cases, though, what I have taken to be Cohen's objection to Kant must lose its critical force, since the ground of pleasure in the beautiful is not attributed, by Kant to the object itself, but to the pleasure arising from the harmony between the cognitive faculties.

With regards to Kant's construal of "pure aesthetic judgements", I believe that the most important of its characteristics is its limitedness which I shall consider now.

To begin with, we should note that Kant has continually stressed

that the aesthetic judgment is not a cognitive judgment. Accordingly, Kant says in the section entitled the "Problem of a Deduction of Judgments of Taste", in the Critique of Judgement, that the necessity of limiting each of the two kinds of judgments results from the following observations. He writes that:

To form a cognitive judgement we may immediately connect with the perception of an object the concept of an object in general, the empirical predicates of which are contained in that perception. In this way a judgement of experience is produced. Now this judgement rests on the foundation of a priori concepts of the synthetical unity of the manifold of intuitions enabling it to be thought as the determination of an object.³² (CJ 287-288)

This is certainly consonant with the Critique of Pure Reason whose primary task was to provide a Deduction of the pure concepts (categories) upon which cognition rests. But the task of the Critique of Judgement is concerned with a different kind of judgment as pointed out in this passage:

we may also immediately connect with a perception a feeling of pleasure (or displeasure) and a delight attending the representation of the Object and serving it instead of a predicate. In this way there³³ arises a judgement which is aesthetic and not cognitive. (CJ 288)

We have already seen, through our analysis of the two types of judgments, that a judgment of taste, in so far as it is "pure", is "free" from any and all intellectual constraints of the understanding. In effect, the judgment that an object is beautiful is an expression of the feeling of pleasure arising from the beauty of the object itself. There is an apparent circularity here, but I do not think this is a particular problem, for Kant, given the way in which the notion of "beauty" is developed.

However, in elucidating the notion of the "beautiful" as he does, Kant precludes any attempt to attribute "knowledge" to judgments of taste. Now, by my reading of Kant, this is precisely what Kant had intended to do. But, even if his intentions were fulfilled, his theory is not entirely exempt from certain criticisms. And there are two considerations whose mention seem warranted in the present context.

One is a possible objection that, because the Kantian conception of taste judgments gives them an 'autonomous' character (in the sense that a judgment of taste is grounded in its own subjective principles rather than governed by the laws of the understanding), it is difficult to see just how it can be connected with their cognitive counterparts. Such an objection points, of course, to an important issue. For, as it was suggested earlier, the estimation of the object (which is one of the three components of a pure aesthetic judgment) ought to be a sort of 'prelude' or a precondition of cognition in general. If it turns out, however, that there cannot be any connection between the two mutually exclusive judgments, then our 'prelude' notion must be reevaluated or, if necessary, abandoned. And such a consequence, I believe, Kant could certainly not permit.

While the difficulty of grasping Kant's moves to connect the two kinds of judgments may be real, he does offer a solution through the dissolution of the "antinomy of taste".³⁴ (CJ Sec.57) Here, Kant admits that:

The judgement of taste must have reference to some concept or other, as otherwise it would be absolutely impossible³⁵ for it to lay claim to necessary validity for every one.
(CJ 339)

But, for Kant, the "concept" that is related to a taste judgment is to be

distinguished from a "concept of the understanding, which is determinable by means of predicates borrowed from sensible intuition and capable of correspondence to it". The concept of the taste judgment is an "indeterminate" concept, i.e. "the transcendental rational concept of the supersensible, which lies at the basis of all that sensible intuition and is, therefore, incapable of being further determined theoretically".³⁶ (CJ 339) Thus, according to Kant, the "free play" that is involved with the exercise of taste allows the emergence of a consciousness (though not knowledge) of the ground of sensibility and understanding, the realm of the supersensible.

The judgement of taste does depend upon a concept (of a general ground of the subjective finality of nature for the power of judgement), but one from which nothing can be cognized in respect of the Object, and nothing proved, because it is in itself indeterminable and useless for knowledge. Yet by means of this very concept it acquires at the same time validity for every one (but with each individual, no doubt, as a singular judgement immediately accompanying his intuition): because its determining ground lies, perhaps, in the concept of what₃₇ may be regarded as the supersensible substrate of humanity. (CJ 340)

Evidently, therefore, the point of conversion, or the point at which the connection between the two kinds of judgment is established, is to be found in the realm of the supersensible. As Kant asserts, we as rational human beings cannot avoid making this reference. He says that we are forced,

whether we like it or not, to look beyond the horizon of the sensible, and to seek in the supersensible the point of union of all our faculties a priori: for we are left with₃₈ no other expedient to bring reason into harmony with itself. (CJ 341)

What was at first seen as "incapable of formulation" with regards to a 'standard of taste', can now be connected with this non-prescriptive

standard of all judgments a priori, namely the "supersensible substrate", which must remain subjective.

There is yet one more important consideration stemming from the limited character of Kant's "judgements of taste". And the point is this: Cohen was right in pointing out that Kant's is a "minimal conception" of taste judgment. One may also point out, in this regard, that all our perceptions are given within a certain context, especially in cases wherein it is a perception of works of art. However, if we are to affirm Kant's limited notion of taste judgments, we would never be able to judge art objects in a way that many would consider just. That is to say, by means of "pure aesthetic judgements", we would not be able to consider or incorporate, in our 'taste' judgment, questions regarding the kind of art work something is, the type of medium utilized, the sort of object depicted, and so on. Kant's notion of "free beauty", which is the only object of "pure aesthetic judgements", cannot offer to a critic of art the kind of 'beauty' that he seeks to discern in his perception of the object. In as much as this is true, we cannot even distinguish, through our taste, between objects of nature and those of art. Thus, one may conclude, along with Cohen, that "the theory is powerless to take account of any of the properties of objects", and hence, "no such theory is competent to be a philosophy of art".³⁹ (Cohen II p.11)

This would be a forceful objection against Kant's theory of taste judgments had Kant intended to provide us with an aesthetic theory in the contemporary sense of "aesthetic". But, as suggested in the preceding, it was not Kant's aim to provide us with what we of the Twentieth

Century conceive as a "philosophy of art".

Nevertheless, it does seem appropriate to repeat here that Kant's "pure" taste judgment is completely shielded against the harness of the "intellect". As such, Kant must admit that his theory encompasses the whole of the nature of aesthetic judgments. But a (pure) taste judgment cannot account for the differences between nature and art. It thus follows that the pleasure that we take in works of art (as such) cannot be accounted for simply by making references to "pure aesthetic judgements". The pleasure arising from the exercise of taste is indiscriminate in this respect. Given such a state of affairs, we are led to look beyond mere judgments of taste in order that we may comprehend what is given in the representation of the object that pleases us as a "work of art".

In guiding our thoughts to look beyond the notion of taste judgment, Kant leads us nearer to the realm in which a true standard of art is to be found, i.e. the inexplicable realm of the supersensible substrate, the determining ground of the nature of humanity. Thus, Kant in accordance with the structure of his theory (and what he takes to be the structure of life itself) concludes that:

such a standard [must] be sought in the element of mere nature in the Subject, which cannot be comprehended under rules or concepts, that is to say, the supersensible substrate of all the Subject's faculties (unattainable by any concept of understanding), and consequently, in that which forms the point of reference for the harmonious accord of all our faculties of cognition--the production of which accord is the ultimate end set by the intelligible basis of our nature. Thus alone is it possible for a subjective and yet universally valid principle a priori to lie at the basis of that finality for which no objective principle can be prescribed.⁴⁰ (CJ 344)

FOOTNOTES FOR CHAPTER THREE

1. D. Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, ed. L.A. Selby-Bigge, 2nd ed., with text revised and variant readings by P.H. Nidditch, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1978, p.415.
2. D. Hume, Enquiries Concerning Human Understanding and Concerning The Principles of Morals, ed. L.A. Selby-Bigge, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1975, p.165.
3. Ibid., p.290.
4. D. Hume, On The Standard Of Taste and Other Essays, ed. J.W. Lenz, The Bobbs-Merrill Co. Inc., New York, 1965, p.7. (Hereafter ST.)
5. Ibid.
6. Ibid.
7. Ibid.
8. Ibid., pp.8-9.
9. Ibid., p.17.
10. Ibid.
11. T. Cohen, "A Reason for the Extra True Judges in Hume's Theory of Taste" and "Dilemma in the Theory of Taste: Hume and Kant". Both are drafts of papers delivered at the University of Alberta in the Fall of 1980. I shall hereafter refer to these papers as 'Cohen I' and 'Cohen II' respectively.
12. P. Kivy, "A Logic of Taste--The First Fifty Years", cf. Aesthetics: A Critical Anthology, eds. G. Dickie and R.J. Sclafani, St. Martins Press, New York, 1977, pp.626-642.
13. Cohen, I, p.1.
14. Cohen, II, p.2.
15. Hume, ST, p.17.

16. Ibid., p.11.
17. Ibid., p.20.
18. Kant, CJ, 228.
19. Ibid., 207.
20. Ibid., 206.
21. Kant, FI, 209.
22. Kant, CJ, 229.
23. Ibid.
24. Ibid., 231-232.
25. Ibid., 232.
26. Ibid., 236.
27. Ibid., 237.
28. Ibid.
29. Ibid., 194.
30. Cohen, II, pp.6-9.
31. Kant, CPR, A133/B172.
32. Kant, CJ, 287-288.
33. Ibid., 288.
34. Ibid., Section 57.
35. Ibid., 339.
36. Ibid.
37. Ibid., 340.
38. Ibid., 341.
39. Cohen, II, p.11.
40. Op.cit., 344.

CHAPTER FOUR

CONCLUSION

It is an important characteristic of Kant's "transcendental philosophy" that the "critical method" allows an investigation of man's knowledge of objects rather than the objects themselves. Through his third Critique, however, Kant has shown us that the systematization of human cognition alone does not exhaust the whole of our being, and that knowledge is dialectically related to the aesthetic modes of conceiving the manifold of representations. The Critique of Pure Reason has shown the limits of our knowledge, and it is the task of the Part I of the Critique of Judgement to show how aesthetic judgments in general and taste judgments in particular fall outside the bounds of cognitive experience. In effect, this thesis has been an elucidation of the idea, though by means of a different vehicle, that the objective knowledge of the supersensible, i.e. rationalist ontology, is an impossibility due to the Kantian conception of the structure of human reason.

Through our investigation of the nature of taste judgment, as presented by Kant, I hope to have shown the reader that: 1) Kant has, with a significant measure of success, remained consistent with the ubiquitous theme of the first Critique, 2) the approach of the "transcendental philosophy" packs more of an explanatory power in clarifying what is involved with the problem of aesthetic taste than that of Hume's empirical approach,

and 3) Kant's demonstration that both cognitive and aesthetic judgments ultimately refer to a priori principles for their grounding enables human reason to transcend the mere phenomenality of knowledge and therefore, a more comprehensive account of the whole of human experience could be given.

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